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Abstract  
The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.” This is what we were told 
the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Part of the challenge lies in fulfilling the 
licensing requirements for adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include 
mandatory participation in parenting classes. The question naturally arises for many 
people who are subjected to these requirements whether they are morally justified. We 
tackle this question in this paper. In our view, while strong reasons exist in favour of 
licensing adoptive parents, these reasons support the licensing not only of adoptive 
parents, but of all or some subset of so-called “natural” parents as well. We therefore 
conclude that the status quo with respect to parental licensing, according to which only 
adoptive parents need to be licensed, is morally unjustified. 
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1. Introduction 
The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.”1 This is what we were told 
the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Much of the challenge presented by 
making a family by means of adoption lies in fulfilling the licensing requirements for 
adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in 
parenting classes. Overcoming these hurdles is not for the faint of heart, we discovered, 
because it is time-consuming and frustrating (not because it is intellectually 
challenging2). Prospective adoptive parents invest significant amounts of time and money 
without always having a clear sense of why the requirements are necessary or why they 
are imposed on adoptive parents alone.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we would like to thank 
the other authors in this volume as well as Reuven Brandt and Anthony Skelton. McLeod 
presented our argument at Trent University in their colloquium series, at the Fourth 
International Conference on Adoption and Culture of the Alliance for the Study of 
Adoption and Culture, at the 2012 Congress of the International Network on Feminist 
Approaches to Bioethics, and in the Health Law and Policy Seminar Series at Dalhouse 
Law School. Thanks to the audiences at these venues for their helpful feedback. McLeod 
is also grateful for funding from the Graham and Gale Wright Fellowship program at 
Western University and the Canadian Institutes for Health Research.  
2 To the contrary, some parts of the process were intellectually numbing, in particular the 
parenting classes, which appeared to be directed at individuals who lack basic common 
sense concerning what children need. 
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In this paper, we consider the question of whether licensing adoptive parents is 
morally justified. In brief, should the state have the right to screen prospective adoptive 
parents by subjecting them to potentially intrusive background checks and vetting? 
Should the state require that such individuals participate in educational programs from 
which “natural parents” are exempt?3 Should it have the right to deny prospective 
adoptive parents the opportunity to parent if it has concerns about their parental 
competency? In our view, while strong reasons exist in favour of licensing adoptive 
parents, these reasons are not unique to adoptive parents: they support the licensing not 
only of adoptive parents but of all or some subset of natural parents as well. We therefore 
conclude that the status quo with respect to parental licensing, according to which only 
adoptive parents need to be licensed, is morally unjustified.4 
After discussing parental licensing in some detail (e.g., the nature of it, what 
actual systems of licensing are like), we turn to various arguments in favour of licensing 
adoptive parents. In our view, each of these arguments fails to justify licensing only these 
parents. Due to limitations of space, we do not survey the many arguments against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The term “natural parents” in the literature refers, it seems, to parents who are not 
currently licensed. The default assumption is that these people will care for their children 
properly—they are natural or naturally parents—and do not need to be licensed. Notice 
that the class of parents who are not now licensed includes not just biological parents, but 
also step-parents and the social (and predominantly heterosexual) parents of children 
created through gamete donation. Natural parenthood is therefore not equivalent to 
biological parenthood. 
4 Below, we elaborate on this description of the status quo. 
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licensing adoptive parents specifically or against licensing parents generally.5 Thus, we 
cannot conclude that any parents, adoptive or otherwise, ought to be licensed. Rather, our 
goal is simply to challenge the common assumption that a license to parent is morally 
justified in the case of adoption but not in the case of (assisted or unassisted) biological 
reproduction. 
 
2. Licensing 
Let us begin by doing three things: first, defining “parental licensing”; second, presenting 
a sample licensing scheme for adoptive parents (the one that we experienced); and third, 
describing what we take to be the status quo on licensing and adoption.  
Parental licensing refers primarily to restrictions imposed on people’s ability to be 
a parent before they become a parent in the social sense.6 In other words, typically such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 These arguments are significant. In our view, the most significant among them rests on 
the claim that we cannot screen for bad parents, because we lack the tools needed to do 
so. Hence, we should not have parental licensing. The necessary tools include tests that 
can predict whether someone will satisfy a certain standard of parenting and good criteria 
for meeting this standard. There is disagreement in the literature about whether reliable 
tests that can predict whether someone will be a bad parent exist (see e.g., Mangel [1988] 
and Sandmire & Wald [1990]). There is also concern about whether we can devise 
appropriate criteria for being a good or decent parent (de Wispelaere & Weinstock, 
2010). 
6 As Hugh LaFollette (1980) notes, parental licensing, like all licensing, involves “prior 
restraint”: “a parental licensing program would deny licenses to applicants judged to be 
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licensing involves restrictions that are in the first instance prospective rather than 
retrospective. When the state interferes retrospectively with people’s ability to parent—
that is, only after they have become parents—such interference typically does not involve 
licensing people to parent.7 The state normally interferes with natural parenthood only to 
this extent, for example, and only then if the parenting is disastrous (de Wispelaere & 
Weinstock, 2010). By contrast, most people who wish to adopt children must fulfill state-
mandated requirements before taking a child into their care. The state licenses them to be 
parents. 
Parental licensing schemes are therefore alike in that they primarily involve 
prospective restrictions on becoming a parent. Otherwise, these schemes can differ 
substantially. For example, they may or may not restrict parenthood retrospectively, that 
is, by requiring that families in which parents are licensed be monitored. (In our case, 
after adopting our son, we had four mandatory visits with our social worker, who then 
had to report her findings to our provincial government.) Systems of licensing can also 
vary in what sort of parenting they aim to exclude—disastrous, not good enough, or sub-
optimal parenting—which in turn should influence what kinds or degrees of restrictions 
they impose, ex ante or ex post. To illustrate these variations in kind and degree, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
incompetent even though they had never maltreated children” (p. 188). Similarly, we 
deny licenses to drive cars to people who have never caused an accident. One has to show 
some competency in the area before being licensed.    
7 On the other hand, parental licensing requirements could be merely retrospective. As 
suggested below in a discussion about children with special needs, we can imagine 
situations in which retrospective restrictions alone function as a form of licensing. 
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respectively, consider that licensing need not involve mandatory parenting classes (these 
classes are a relatively recent requirement in our province, Ontario) and the frequency of 
monitoring families after they have been created can, of course, differ.  
 The general definition of parental licensing just offered identifies what is at the 
core of parental licensing; however, it does not explain why being licensed is often 
onerous for prospective parents. To gain a sense of why actual licensing schemes, those 
that target adoptive parents, may not be for the faint of heart, consider the scheme 
currently in place in Ontario.8 The licensing system here is somewhat unusual only in that 
it requires prospective parents to take parenting classes. Anyone who is a resident of 
Ontario and who wishes to adopt a child domestically (either publicly or privately) or 
internationally must have a home study conducted and must complete parenting classes 
called PRIDE: Parent Resource for Information Development and Education.9 The stated 
purpose of these requirements is to determine whether prospective adoptive parents are 
ready to become adoptive parents and to determine what sort of child they might be 
willing to adopt. The home study requires references and criminal background 
clearances. It includes details concerning one’s personal and family background; 
significant people in one’s life; one’s family relationships; why one wants to adopt a 
child; one’s expectations for the child; one’s parenting skills; how one plans to integrate 
the child into one’s family; one’s current family environment; one’s health, education, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In our province, adoption is regulated by two pieces of legislation: the Child and Family 
Services Act, RSO 1990, c. C-11, and the Intercountry Adoption Act, 1998, SO 1998 c. 
29. 
9 See http://www.children.gov.on.ca/htdocs/English/topics/adoption/how/index.aspx. 
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employment, and finances; and the social worker’s recommendation. The home study 
must be updated if one’s adoption is not complete within two years. An update is also 
required if one wants to adopt another child. Thus, one is licensed for one adoption at a 
time, and that adoption has to occur within two years. 
There are challenges in meeting the above requirements in terms of time, and 
often money and privacy. Collecting all of the data for the home study takes a significant 
amount of time. For example, one must schedule multiple meetings with a social worker, 
undergo a physical examination by a physician, and apply in person for criminal 
background checks. The parenting classes are also time-consuming: the total class time is 
28-32 hours.10 The financial costs for PRIDE training are $700 per individual or $1,400 
per couple, and for the home study, upwards of $2,500. These costs are borne by the 
prospective adoptive parents in the case of an international or private domestic adoption, 
while they are borne by the state in the case of a public domestic adoption. As noted 
above, the investment of time or money in being licensed for adoption is frustrating when 
prospective parents lack a clear sense of why they alone have to meet these requirements. 
The process can also seem intrusive, given that one has to provide information about 
one’s self and one’s family that is normally deemed private (normally, that is, if one is a 
natural parent).  
We have said that according to the status quo, only adoptive parents have to 
satisfy licensing requirements such as the home study. However, this description of the 
status quo needs to be unpacked, in part because there are different forms of adoption and 
not all forms involve licensing. The key distinction for our purposes is between what we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See https://secure.adoptontario.ca/pride.main.aspx. 
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will call family member adoption and non-family member adoption.11 As we take it, with 
few exceptions,12 the status quo requires licensing only in the context of non-family 
member adoptions.13 There are two types of family member adoption: step-parent 
adoptions, where an individual who has remarried wishes to adopt the children of his or 
her new spouse; and relative adoptions, which occur where parents can no longer care for 
a child and a relative wishes to adopt that child.14 Focusing again on Ontario, where all 
parties—prospective adoptive parent, current parent, and child—reside in Ontario, the 
process of family member adoption entails simply submitting an application to an Ontario 
Family Court. No agency is involved and no licensing is required. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is the terminology used in Ontario. Other jurisdictions may employ different 
language to draw the same distinction. 
12 An exception in Ontario is a family member adoption where the child resides in 
another country; for explanation, see ftn 14. 
13 The most common forms of non-family member adoptions are public or private 
domestic adoptions, where a private or a government agency, respectively, facilitates the 
adoption of a child residing in the same country as the prospective adoptive parents; and 
international or intercountry adoptions, where a private adoption agency licensed by the 
government of the prospective adoptive parents’ country of residence assists in the 
adoption of a child residing in a foreign country. 
14 “Relative” is a legal concept. According to Ontario’s legislation, a relative is a 
grandparent, uncle or great-uncle, or an aunt or great-aunt. Thus, for the purposes of 
relative adoption, a relative need not be related to the adoptive child by blood, since an 
individual could adopt, via relative adoption, the child of his or her spouse’s sister. 
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In summary, when we refer to the status quo on licensing and adoption, we have 
in mind licensing only for non-family member adoption.15 Our research tells us that this 
is the status quo in most Western jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the UK, and the USA.16 Thus, we focus in what follows on whether there should 
be licensing for prospective non-family member adoptive parents, but not for other 
prospective parents. (For simplicity’s sake, we call the parents who require licensing 
according to the status quo simply adoptive parents.) To be clear, our aim is to determine 
whether licensing of some form or other, for these parents alone, is morally justified; our 
goal is not to examine what form parental licensing should take. Thus, we consider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Which is not to say that all family member adoptions are exempt from licensing 
requirements. For example, family member adoptions in which the child lives outside of 
Canada are treated in Ontario like international or intercounty adoptions. Similarly, if a 
prospective adoptive parent wishes to adopt a child to whom she is related in a way that 
is not captured by Ontario’s legal definition of a relative, she must follow the same steps 
as for any other (non-family member) adoption. See 
http://www.children.gov.on.ca/htdocs/English/topics/adoption/how/index.aspx. 
16 One exception that we know of is the licensing in the U.K. for the intended parents of 
children created through embryo donation and contract pregnancy (see 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1424.html#5). Here, there is licensing with some assisted 
biological reproduction. (Also note that sometimes with assisted reproduction, parental 
screening is mandated not by the state, but by a fertility clinic or embryo “adoption” 
program. See Krueger, 2011 and Frith, Blyth, & Berger, 2011.) 
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arguments in favour of licensing adoptive parents that support different kinds of licensing 
schemes. Let us turn to those arguments now. 
 
3. The Arguments in Favour of Licensing Adoptive Parents 
We are interested in arguments in favour not of licensing parents generally, but of 
licensing adoptive parents specifically. An example of the former type of argument 
comes from Hugh LaFollette. He contends that the problem of disastrous parenting 
provides the state with a reason to license all parents (LaFollette, 1980). Others17 would 
claim, by contrast, that because disastrous parenting is more likely to occur in adoptive 
families, the state is justified in licensing adoptive parents alone. This latter view is 
clearly specific to the adoption context. We consider four arguments that are intended to 
be specific in this regard. They are based either on (1) harm to prospective adoptive 
children; (2) the feasibility of licensing adoptive parents; (3) the transfer of parental 
responsibility that occurs during an adoption; or (4) the lack of a claim by prospective 
adoptive parents to a specific child. Our goal is to show that insofar as these arguments 
purport to be adoption-specific, they fail either because they are more general than they 
might initially appear to be and so do not support licensing only adoptive parents, or 
because they do not establish that licensing is justified for adoptive parents, and so do not 
justify the licensing requirement in the first place.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 By “others,” we simply mean members of the general public, whom we think are likely 
to have the beliefs described below that would support the view that disastrous parenting 
is more common among adoptive parents. An example is the belief that the lack of a 
biological tie signals a lack of natural affection.   
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3.1 Harm to children 
The first of the above arguments revolves around concerns about harm to children. Some 
would argue that adopted children are at greater risk of harm from bad or incompetent 
parenting than are non-adopted children. Screening prospective adoptive parents is 
therefore important insofar as it reduces this risk. The reasons one might give in favour of 
such a view are twofold: (1) the lack of a biological tie between parent and child in an 
adoption increases the possibility of harm to the child; and (2) adopted children have 
special needs that not everyone is competent is satisfy; these children will be harmed 
unless the state ensures that their parents possess the relevant competence. Our analysis 
of each of these reasons shows that they fail to justify the status quo on parental 
licensing.  
Why would the lack of a biological connection between parent and child increase 
the likelihood of abuse or neglect in the parent-child relationship? For many, the answer 
to this question is obvious: parents who are not biologically related to their children have 
no “natural affection” for them and so are more likely to harm them (LaFollette, 1980, p. 
195). The thought here, presumably, is not that adoptive parents cannot feel affection for 
their children—that would be absurd—but that the affection is not instinctual in the way 
in which it supposedly is with biological parents. Such ideas explain why we have 
screening for adoptive parents in the first place, according to Elizabeth Bartholet (1993, 
p. 81).  
However, the claim that adopted children are at heightened risk of abuse from 
their parents is unsubstantiated, as Bartholet and others, including LaFollette, explain (see 
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Bartholet, 1993, ch. 8; LaFollette, 1980, 2010). In a recent paper in which he revisits the 
topic of parental licensing, LaFollette cites a study on the “importance of biological ties 
for parental investment” which concludes that adoptive parents are as invested in their 
children as biological parents are (LaFollette, 2010, p. 336; citing Hamilton et al, 2007). 
He also writes that adopted children “are less than half as likely to be maltreated 
compared to children reared by their biological parents” (LaFollette, 2010, p. 336). 
Additionally, in her work on the value of biological ties, Sally Haslanger (2009) cites 
research showing that compared to non-adoptees, adoptees “do not suffer in developing a 
core self” (i.e., a self imbued with worth, confidence, and the like; p. 105), a result that 
would be unlikely if abuse from adoptive parents was more common than from non-
adoptive parents.  
However, perhaps there is insufficient evidence of adopted children being at 
heightened risk of abuse from their parents precisely because adoption licensing is 
effective at screening out people who would abuse their non-biological children. If 
people could simply walk into an adoption agency and walk out with a child, then abuse 
rates might be quite high within adoptive families. In responding to this concern, one 
must ask, first, whether the rates of abuse would be higher than they are with biological 
parents, and second, whether those higher rates would justify screening one group but not 
the other. In our view, one should not simply speculate about what the answers are. And 
regardless, one cannot assume that current screening of adoptive parents explains why 
levels of abuse by adoptive parents are low. The screening might not be effective. (It is 
not effective, according to Bartholet, and it could not now be effective, according to 
Michael Sandmire and Michael Wald, who argue that we lack reliable tools for predicting 
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who will abuse children.) Thus, for all this argument says, it may be that people who 
want to adopt children are simply not likely to abuse them.  
In short, arguments in favour of licensing based on harm to children and a lack of 
biological relatedness in adoptive families may not be empirically valid. But more 
important for our purposes is the observation that even if such arguments were 
empirically valid, they would not be specific to the adoption context and so would not 
support the status quo. The arguments justify licensing for a larger group of parents than 
just adoptive ones.18 The reason, of course, is that some non-biological (more specifically 
non-genetic19) parents are not adoptive parents. Examples include parents whose children 
were conceived using donor gametes. If the lack of a biological tie signals a heightened 
risk of abuse and a need for parental screening, then these parents ought to be screened 
along with adoptive parents.   
A different sort of argument in favour of licensing that is based on harm to 
children focuses not on the lack of a biological tie but rather on the special needs of 
adopted children and the harm that parents can cause if they are not competent to meet 
these needs. For example, David Archard maintains that because adopted children “may 
present particular and possibly serious difficulties … arising from the fact that they have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 And they support licensing for some adoptive parents who are not currently licensed, 
such as adoptive step-parents. 
19 Some maintain that the class of biological parents includes gestational but non-genetic 
parents who develop a biological connection with their children (i.e., the children they 
gestate) during the gestational process (e.g., Feldman, 1992). The argument we are 
considering now does not include these biological parents. 
	   14 
been rejected or abused by their natural parents,” regulating adoption is justified 
(Archard, 1993, p. 146; cited in Engster, 2010, p. 253). (The suggestion that if the natural 
parents of children who are adopted have not abused these children, then they have at 
least rejected them is seriously problematic, given that these parents may act in their 
child’s best interests by giving them up for adoption. Nonetheless, some adopted children 
may feel rejected and have special needs as a result.) Adopted children could have special 
needs for reasons beyond having been abused or feeling abandoned by their natural 
parents. Some people—such as David Velleman (2005)—suggest that these children face 
special challenges insofar as they lack an ongoing connection with biological relatives 
(see Witt, DATE, in this volume). These same people oppose the donation of gametes 
for others’ reproductive use because the practice deprives children born as a result of it of 
their biological identity. Others would worry that adopted children’s lives are especially 
difficult by virtue of them having a non-biological (and possibly transracial) family in a 
culture that is biased against such families. As Bartholet (1993) explains, our society has 
a “biologic bias” (ch. 2), that is, a bias in favour of biological families, which are 
presumed to be more “real” somehow than adoptive families. Licensing—especially if it 
includes an educational component—can serve to ensure that adoptive parents are 
competent to parent children with such needs. 
Our response to the above argument is unsurprising: if children’s special needs 
justify licensing adoptive parents, then they must also justify licensing some natural 
parents, namely those who have children with special needs. But while some children 
who are not adopted have special needs, we do not license their parents. Moreover, the 
needs of adopted children in general do not seem so dire that we need to ensure that their 
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parents, but not the parents of other children with special needs, are competent to care for 
them. In our view, the point about special needs speaks in favour only of education for—
not necessarily licensing of—adoptive parents. The education should also not be 
mandatory, at least not unless similar educational programs are mandatory for other 
parents of children with special needs.20 Finally, the educational programs in question 
should not be driven by views about the needs of adopted children that support and 
entrench the biologic bias of our society. The claim that these children need ongoing 
contact with biological relatives in order to form a stable identity, regardless of whether 
they live in a society that privileges biological families over other families,21 is arguably 
a case in point. We agree with others who suggest that such claims are purely speculative 
(Haslanger, 2009; Kolodny, 2010, p. 61, note 33; Lotz & Witt, DATE, in this volume).  
In short, arguments based on harm to children that favour the licensing of 
adoptive parents cannot explain the status quo on parental licensing. For it is not at all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Some might worry that adoptive parents will not care enough about their children to 
seek out these educational opportunities. However, this objection is predicated on the 
view that adoptive parents lack affection for their children, which we have noted is 
unsubstantiated. 
21 The biologic bias might explain the need that some adopted children feel to know their 
biological relatives (see Haslanger, 2009, p. 113). Our society’s response to this need 
(e.g., in the education we give to adoptive parents) should differ depending on whether 
we understand it to be a byproduct of a culture that stigmatizes adoptive families 
(Haslanger, 2009, p. 114). 
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clear that adopted children are at special risk of harm from parents who are either abusive 
or not competent to satisfy these children’s needs.   
 
3.2 Feasibility 
Now consider a different argument in favour of licensing adoptive parents: while all 
parents ought in principle to be licensed, licensing adoptive parents is feasible or 
manageable in a way in which licensing natural parents is not. Because the latter would 
have too many negative effects, particularly on women and children, licensing adoptive 
parents is a “next best” solution. Daniel Engster (2010) makes this sort of argument,22 
and in doing so emphasizes the “unequal impact” that licensing biological parents would 
have on women compared to men (p. 248). For example, women without a license to 
parent a child who experience an unplanned pregnancy would be forced to consider 
having an abortion or having a child with whom they were in a close physical 
relationship for nine months taken away from them (Engster, 2010, pp. 247-248). To try 
to avoid this second outcome, they could try to hide their pregnancy, which would 
involve foregoing assistance from health care professionals during pregnancy and birth; 
but, of course, this option would pose serious risks to their health and to the health of 
their child (Engster, 2010, pp. 247-248). On the other hand, men would not face choices 
as distressing as these as a result of parental licensing. Even after the birth of their child, 
their situation would not be the same as that of women who give birth. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Above all, the main reason for supporting a screening and licensing program for 
adoptive parents but not for biological parents is because of the greater viability of the 
former” (Engster, 2010, p. 253). 
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given the unequal economic status between women and men, the choice between staying 
with a partner who is denied a parental license and keeping one’s child would not be as 
difficult, on average, for heterosexual men compared to heterosexual women (Engster, 
2010, p. 248). In general, men leave women without experiencing as much financial 
hardship as women do when they leave men. For Engster (2010), the disproportionate 
burden that widespread parental licensing would have on women is too great. He also 
worries about harm that would befall children who are created but do not have a home to 
go to because their parents do not have a parenting license and so lose custody of them at 
birth (p. 250).  
We think the feasibility argument is very important; however, our complaint, 
again, is that the argument does not justify licensing adoptive parents alone. The reason is 
that parental licensing is as feasible for people who reproduce with assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART) as it is for people who create families by adopting children. To 
explain, consider the point made by Engster that if we were to license biological parents, 
then ideally applications for licenses would occur before women become pregnant. But 
there is an obvious problem with timing the applications prior to pregnancy: namely that 
“many pregnancies are unplanned” (Engster, 2010, p. 246). What Engster fails to notice, 
however, is that the problem of planning does not affect all biological parents equally. In 
particular, it does not arise with biological parents who reproduce using ART. (There will 
be no unplanned pregnancies in this group!) By Engster’s own lights, then, licensing is an 
option for these biological parents, since the women involved would not have to make 
difficult decisions about abortion or about having to avoid prenatal care. In sum, the 
feasibility argument does not support the status quo, in which infertile people are free 
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from scrutiny as prospective parents before they attempt technologically assisted 
conception. To the contrary, the feasibility argument encourages a system in which 
access to ART is available only to people with a parenting license. 23 
 
3.3 Transfer of Responsibility  
A third argument in favour of licensing adoptive parents hinges on certain important facts 
about the adoption context: before an adoption occurs there exists a child for whom 
someone—the state or an actual person—is responsible, and during an adoption, this 
responsibility is transferred to someone else, namely the child’s adoptive parent(s).24 The 
argument then proceeds as follows: the transfer of parental responsibility in an adoption 
ought to occur in a morally serious manner, but that can happen only if the party or 
parties relinquishing responsibility for the child can reasonably expect that the child’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 One could run a similar argument that focuses on procreative rights, rather than on 
feasibility. That is, one could insist that women’s procreative rights prevent the state from 
interfering in their pregnancies, but not with their access to ART. This conclusion 
presumably follows if procreative rights are merely negative rights.  
Since we have a separate project in which we examine procreative rights and how 
they should influence the way the state treats biological parents compared to adoptive 
ones, we do not discuss these rights in this paper.   
24 For ease of exposition, we will assume in the remainder of this section that 
responsibility is being transferred to two parents, rather than one.  
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future will be good (or at least good enough). Licensing provides such assurance to the 
child’s pre-adoptive guardians and is justified for this reason.25 
Although we find the transfer of responsibility argument intriguing, we doubt that 
it supports the status quo on licensing. To see why, consider first that transfers of parental 
responsibility may not be unique to the adoption context; they might occur in certain 
assisted reproductive contexts as well. For example, David Benatar insists that such 
transfers happen whenever people donate their gametes for others’ reproductive use.26 He 
makes this claim in “The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing Into Being” (Benatar, 1999), 
which provides the main impetus for the transfer of responsibility argument in favour of 
adoption licensing, as we have constructed it. Benatar argues as follows. In providing 
gametes to others for their reproductive use, one is transferring child-rearing 
responsibilities that one has in any children “who result from” one’s gametes (Benatar, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The reasoning here is straightforward. If we think—as we surely do—that delegating 
responsibility for a child to someone else, such as a nanny, should occur in a morally 
serious manner—that we ought to do so only after having met the nanny and seen her 
references, for example—then surely we ought to conclude that transferring 
responsibility for a child from a pre-adoption guardian to a post-adoption guardian (i.e., 
the child’s adoptive parent) should occur in that way as well. 
A version of the transfer of responsibility argument can be found in Engster 
(2010): he argues that the state has “a special responsibility to assure the biological 
parents of an adoptive child” that their child is well placed (p. 253). 
26 See Weinberg (2008) for a similar discussion about gamete donation and parental 
responsibility.  
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1999, p. 174). Moreover, transferring child-rearing responsibilities is a morally serious 
business: no one should do it lightly. However, most gamete donors do do it lightly, 
according to Benatar. Typically, they do it anonymously and thus give little to no 
consideration to whether the people who will obtain their gametes are competent to 
parent a child. Hence, their actions are morally wrong. The “lightness” with which 
gamete donors allow beings created from their gametes to come into being is unbearable 
to Benatar. He does not insist that people who reproduce using donor gametes be 
licensed, which could allow gamete donors to transfer their responsibilities in a morally 
serious way. The transfer of responsibility argument that we have been considering 
would certainly support this conclusion, however. Thus, the argument extends to the 
licensing of gamete donors, assuming that Benatar is correct about their moral situation.  
Another possibility (one that we think is more likely) is that transfers of parental 
responsibility occur in the context of contract pregnancy, which would mean that people 
who become parents through this practice should also be licensed. For what it is worth, 
we find it unlikely that gamete donors transfer parental responsibility to the social parents 
of the children produced from their gametes, for we are not convinced by Benatar that 
they acquire any such responsibility.27 However, we are more persuaded that women who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Benatar’s (1999) specific claim is that “[p]eople have a presumptive responsibility for 
rearing children who result from their gametes” (p. 173). He explains this responsibility 
in terms not of mere biology (i.e., of biological parenthood), but of the exercise of one’s 
reproductive autonomy (Benatar, 1999, p. 174). Reproductive autonomy involves the 
freedom to make reproductive decisions, and with this freedom comes responsibility 
for—as Benatar (1999) puts it—one’s “reproductive conduct” (p. 174). He argues that if 
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gestate children for others assume parental responsibility that they must then transfer to 
the child’s social parents at birth. The relationship formed between the pregnant woman 
and her fetus during gestation arguably grounds parenthood better than mere genetics.28 
Of course, so long as either a genetic connection or gestation gives rise to parental 
responsibilities, transfers of these responsibilities will occur outside of adoptions and 
within what has been called “third party reproduction.” In addition, if the transfer of 
responsibility argument is sound, then some or all people who reproduce with the 
assistance of third parties will have to be licensed, just as adoptive parents are licensed. 
Again, the status quo finds little support within the argument we are considering. 
One could further question whether the transfer of responsibility argument 
justifies the status quo on licensing by making the following observation. According to 
this argument, transfers of parental responsibility require the kind of scrutiny that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the conduct results in a child, then one is responsible for rearing this child, that is, unless 
one transfers this responsibility to someone else. To apply this argument to gamete 
donors: their conduct involving their gametes results in a child, making them 
presumptively responsible for rearing this child; however, they defeat the presumption 
when they transfer the responsibility to the recipients of their gametes. The weakness in 
Benatar’s argument for why gamete donors have this childrearing responsibility is his 
failure to spell out what counts as reproductive conduct. He seems to exclude donations 
of gonadal tissue from this category, for example (even though gametes are part of the 
tissue; Benatar, 1999, p. 175), but gives no explanation for why these donations would 
not count, while donations of sperm and eggs do count, as “reproductive conduct.” 	  
28 On the “grounds of parenthood,” see Bayne and Kolers (2006). 
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licensing provides; however, a similar claim could also be made about acquisitions of 
parental responsibility.29 Do we really think that more thought and information should go 
into transferring or delegating responsibility for children than goes into acquiring that 
responsibility in the first place?30 If, as we think, the answer is “no,” then the 
considerations that led us to accept parental licensing when there are transfers of parental 
responsibility should prompt us to accept it more generally. 
Thus, it is not at all obvious that the transfer of responsibility argument can 
ground a system of licensing in which only adoptive parents are licensed. One could use 
the reasoning found in this argument to show that some (or all) people who have children 
as a result of third party reproduction need a parenting license. Moreover, one could use 
similar reasoning to prove that LaFollette is correct in thinking that all parents—whether 
they acquire their parental responsibility on their own or have others transfer it to them—
should be licensed.  
But it might be objected that thus far, we have ignored an important fact about 
transfers of responsibility for children who are adopted: that these transfers inevitably 
involve the state. We have also ignored an important distinction: namely between the 
state’s doing something and the state’s allowing something to happen. In short, one might 
insist that when the state does something—namely transfer responsibility to adoptive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 We owe this point to Reuven Brandt.  
30 Of course, we think that people ought to take the question of whether to bring a child 
into the world very seriously. We think it irresponsible of people to engage in 
unprotected sexual intercourse when there is a risk of pregnancy but no desire to create a 
child.  
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parents—it acquires an obligation to ensure that those individuals are or will be 
minimally competent parents, an obligation that it discharges by the licensing 
requirement. On the other hand, when the state merely allows something to happen, as 
when it allows individuals to engage in procreative sex or to engage in third party 
reproduction, it acquires no such obligation, and so the licensing of those individuals is 
not necessary. It is this distinction—between the state’s doing something and the state’s 
merely allowing something to happen—that explains why licensing adoptive parents is 
permissible but licensing non-adoptive parents is not.  
This is an interesting argument. All the same, in our view it can and should be 
resisted. For one thing, the doing/allowing distinction is notoriously slippery, and it is 
unclear how much normative weight it can bear.31 But even if we are prepared to accept 
the distinction for present purposes, it by no means follows that appeal to it can justify 
the status quo. With this in mind, note that because there are different ways in which 
transfers of responsibility occur in the adoption context, there are different ways in which 
the state can be implicated in those transfers. For example, in some cases responsibility 
for a prospective adopted child is transferred from the biological parents to the state, 
which then transfers responsibility for that child to the adoptive parents. In this sort of 
situation the state is, at some point, legally responsible for the child in its care and is 
therefore directly implicated in the transfer of responsibility. And it might be argued that 
it is this fact that justifies the state’s licensing of adoptive parents: because the state is 
actively doing something by transferring its responsibility for a child to somebody else, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For discussion see Quinn (1989) and Thomson (1976). 
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has an obligation to ensure that those prospective parents are minimally competent. 
Public domestic adoptions clearly conform to this model.32  
The problem, however, is that not all cases of adoption involve the state assuming 
and transferring parental responsibility. For in many cases the state never assumes legal 
responsibility for the child, although it may play a role in overseeing the transfer of 
responsibility for the prospective adopted child from the biological parents or other legal 
guardians to the adoptive parents. In international adoptions, for example, two states are 
involved: the foreign state where the prospective adopted child resides and the domestic 
state where the prospective adoptive parents live. In an international adoption, however, 
responsibility for the prospective adopted child is never transferred to the domestic state. 
What the domestic state does is ensure that the foreign adoption process conforms to its 
own domestic laws and regulations and perhaps to universal conventions, such as the 
Hague Convention.33 The domestic state signals its approval of this process by agreeing 
to issue various government documents, such as a visa and/or a citizenship certificate for 
the adopted child. Similarly, in the case of private domestic adoptions, the prospective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In such cases, responsibility for the child is initially transferred, sometimes voluntarily, 
sometimes involuntarily, from the biological parent to the state—which is to say that the 
child becomes a ward of the state—after which the state transfers that responsibility to 
the child’s adoptive parents. 
33 That is, the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. See 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69. 
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adopted child never becomes a ward of the state, and so the state never assumes 
responsibility for the child, and so never transfers that responsibility to someone else.  
What does the foregoing indicate about the transfer of responsibility argument? It 
shows that the argument fails to justify the status quo on parental licensing, if the 
normative principle underlying the argument is that with adoption, the state inevitably 
does something normatively significant, namely transfer its responsibility for a child to 
somebody else. The problem is that only some adoptions, namely public domestic 
adoptions, are captured by this principle. Hence, the transfer of responsibility argument, 
so understood, can only justify licensing prospective parents in these adoptions.     
Conversely, the claim that the state takes no responsibility or ought not to do so 
when it merely allows (assisted or unassisted) procreative activity to occur seems 
doubtful. The state does sometimes intervene in such contexts, as when it removes a child 
from a biological parent who has a history of child abuse or has previously had a child 
apprehended and removed from his or her care. Moreover, if the following is true—that 
transfers of responsibility occur in the context of contract pregnancy, that there is no 
relevant normative distinction between them and transfers that happen in private 
domestic or international adoptions, and that the state is prepared to require that 
prospective parents in these adoptions be licensed—then the state ought to require that 
people who become parents via contract pregnancy are licensed. But this point makes 
trouble for the transfer of responsibility argument framed using the doing/allowing 
distinction, since in cases of contract pregnancy the state merely allows a certain kind of 
procreative activity to occur. This way of framing the argument is therefore not 
persuasive.  
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Finally, consider the suggestion that the transfer of responsibility argument should 
be based instead on the following normative principle: that prospective adoptive parents 
should be licensed because the state, in overseeing the transfer of responsibility, has an 
obligation to ensure that children have parents who are minimally competent. Here again 
it is plain that the transfer of responsibility argument cannot justify the status quo, since 
this normative principle applies to adoptive parents who are currently exempt from the 
licensing requirements, such as step-parents, and also, arguably, to the social parents of 
children born through contract pregnancy. In addition, the principle must extend to the 
overseeing of acquisitions of parental responsibility (e.g., through procreative sex and 
pregnancy), if one accepts the moral equivalence of transfers and acquisitions of this 
responsibility (see above). In that case, the principle applies to all prospective parents, 
adoptive and non-adoptive alike. 
In short, the problem with the transfer of responsibility argument is that its core 
normative principle results in an argument that is either underinclusive—since it does not 
apply to all adoptive parents—or overinclusive—since it applies to adoptive and non-
adoptive parents equally. Either way, the argument does not justify the status quo.  
 
3.4 No Claim to a Specific Child 
The final argument we will consider in support of the status quo points to what is taken to 
be a unique feature of the situation of prospective adoptive parents: unlike people who 
reproduce with or without assistance, prospective adoptive parents do not have a 
legitimate claim to a particular child. That is to say, there is no child that they could 
possibly say is theirs before the adoption occurs. But according to this argument, the 
	   27 
same is not true of natural parents, not even those who reproduce with assistance from 
third parties. For example, people who initiate contract pregnancies can claim to be the 
parents, or at least to be included among the parents, of the resulting child. (They are 
what have been called the child’s “intentional” parents. See Hill (1991).) The argument 
then proceeds as follows. Natural parents have a legitimate complaint to make against a 
system of licensing that might deny them the opportunity to parent, given that the child it 
would prevent them from parenting is their own. The situation is different, however, for 
prospective adoptive parents, since licensing them does not ignore or interfere with any 
claim they have to a specific child (de Wispelaere & Weinstock, 2010). Licensing them is 
therefore permissible. 
However, can the fact that prospective adoptive parents lack a claim to a specific 
child justify licensing them, and them alone? In our view, the answer is “no,” for two 
reasons. First, the view that prospective adoptive parents lack a claim to a specific child 
is, for some adoptive parents, simply false. For example, in many jurisdictions, lesbian 
couples that have children via donor insemination or IVF are treated differently from 
heterosexual couples that have children in the same way. For while the lesbian partner 
who gives birth to the child is, as a result of that biological fact, considered to be the 
child’s legal parent, the other lesbian partner is not, and must adopt the child to become 
its legal parent. (The law treats homosexual and heterosexual couples differently in this 
regard because of the parentage presumption: the legal principle that says where a 
heterosexual couple has a child, the husband is presumed to be the father of the child. See 
Crawford in this volume.) Consequently, the situation of lesbian couples constitutes a 
case where a prospective adoptive parent does have a legitimate claim to a specific child, 
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or where there is a specific child who is hers prior to the adoption. So our first objection 
is that the argument that prospective adoptive parents do not have a legitimate claim to a 
particular child is open to counter-examples. 
But let us set that worry aside. For even supposing that prospective adoptive 
parents do not have a claim to a specific child, we cannot get from this fact an argument 
that licensing adoptive parents is justified. All that we can get from it is that a particular 
kind of complaint against licensing is not available to prospective adoptive parents: that 
the licensing might prevent them from parenting their child. Something other than the 
fact that there is no child that is in any sense theirs must explain why prospective 
adoptive parents must undergo screening. Consider that one could respond to prospective 
adoptive parents having no claim to a specific child by simply matching them with a 
child or by allowing them to pick one. That is, one could meet the challenge of the no-
claim-to-a-specific-child argument without testing the parental competency of 
prospective adoptive parents at all. Thus, the conclusion that adoptive parents ought to be 
licensed cannot be based on the fact that there is no specific child to which they have an 
antecedent claim. 
Yet perhaps one could strengthen the above argument in favour of licensing 
adoptive parents by adding the following premise to it: children who are not tethered to a 
particular adult should get good parents or even the best possible parents.34 Indeed, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 One might add that children available for adoption are in short supply, so “why not 
select those who will do the best job,” or at least a good job, at parenting them? 
(Bartholet, 1993, p. 82). Bartholet rightly responds that these children are not in short 
supply, given in particular “the untold millions” of children around the world who live in 
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arguable that the reason why we do not ensure that all children have good parents or the 
best possible parents is that redistributing children at birth violates the rights of adults 
who have an interest in rearing their own biological children.35 In other words, while we 
might think that all children are owed good parents, there are other interests that must be 
taken into account when children have biological parents who want to care for them.   
The question that naturally arises, then, is whether the interest many people have 
in raising their biological children trumps the interest these children have in being raised 
by good parents. The answer must be “yes” for the strengthened argument set out above 
to work. Yet finding a good argument to support this conclusion is difficult. Like Harry 
Brighouse and Adam Swift (2006), we are unaware of such an argument in the literature 
(pp. 97-98). But without one, it is impossible to say with confidence that the fact that 
natural parents have a claim to a specific child is what precludes the state from licensing 
them, while the fact that prospective adoptive parents have no such claim explains why 
they can legitimately be licensed. 
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orphanages. (See also Rulli, DATE, in this volume.) If our experience with visiting 
orphanages in Africa is any indication of the current supply of prospective adopted 
children, then the supply is large indeed.   
35 In an influential paper on parents’ rights, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2006) 
argue that redistributing children at birth can violate the rights of adults, but only those 
who “would be adequately good parents” (p. 98). Their view is not incompatible with 
licensing natural parents.  
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In this chapter we have canvassed a number of arguments—the best we could think of—
that are designed to establish that the status quo on parental licensing is justified. As we 
have tried to show, none of these arguments succeeds in this task, since all of them 
support licensing for a larger group of parents than just (non-family member) adoptive 
parents. The relevant larger group is, for the arguments based on the risk of harm to 
children, either all non-biological parents or all parents who have children with special 
needs; for the feasibility argument, all people who reproduce using ART and all adoptive 
parents; and for the transfer of responsibility and no claim to a specific child arguments, 
most likely all parents.   
We do not, and cannot, conclude that parental licensing ought to occur for any of 
the above groups. To do so, we would need to show that all arguments against licensing 
these parents are flawed, or are at least not as strong as arguments in favour of licensing 
them, and this is not something we have tried to do. We are also uncomfortable 
concluding that those who engage in unassisted reproduction should be licensed, because 
the feasibility argument speaks so strongly against licensing these people. On the other 
hand, from our perspective, it seems unfair to license only prospective adoptive parents 
and people who reproduce using ART. Thus, we are unsure what system of licensing, if 
any, we would endorse.   
What we are fairly certain of, however, is that the differential treatment of 
adoptive and non-adoptive parents with respect to licensing is unjustified. Let us end by 
explaining why it is important to challenge this practice. A core issue, as we have noted, 
concerns fairness. Simply put, it strikes many as unfair that one class of prospective 
parents are subject to potentially intrusive licensing and screening requirements while 
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other groups of prospective parents are not. Again, what is it about adoptive parents that 
make them, and them alone, subject to licensing requirements? Our answer, in a nutshell, 
is: nothing. A deeper concern, however, is the following. The current licensing regime 
serves to reinforce the belief that biological families are superior to (more natural, less 
likely to be dysfunctional, than) adoptive families; it promotes, in other words, the 
biological bias. For this reason, requiring licensing for adoptive parents alone may in fact 
harm adopted children and their families, given that it expresses, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the view that these families are normatively suspect. 
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